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ABSTRACT
“THEY WILL CHANGE THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY”: PERPETRATOR
SUBGROUPS AND GERMANY’S GENOCIDAL PRACTICES IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA
The genocide of the Herero tribe in German Southwest Africa illuminates the horrors of
colonialism broadly and of German settler colonialism more specifically. I contend that the
perpetrators of this event can be separated into two broad subgroups, the Old Africans and the
Metropole Soldiers, distinguished by their intentions, exploitative and exterminatory
respectively, concerning the indigenous tribes. Those intentions were formed over varying
lengths of time but are the result of either firsthand experience with the racial hierarchy in the
colony or relying on information and misinformation relayed to the metropole. Utilizing
primarily letters, diaries, journals, and postcards, I argue that the often misconstrued and even
blatantly false information that settlers sent back to Germany created a disconnect between
colony and metropole and ultimately fed the German military’s exterminatory policies. Though
often seen as a single perpetrator group, these two subgroups should be viewed as ideological
competitors with notably different worldviews and end goals.
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This thesis takes as its point of departure the arrival of German reinforcements
Swakopmund in April, 1904 to the shores of German Southwest Africa because it immediately
turned the tide in Germany’s colonial war against the Herero. This seemingly mundane military
maneuver acted as a pivotal moment in the actualization of the twentieth century’s first genocide
because accompanying these soldiers was a new policy and ideology that was at odds with the
extant colonial system. Until this point, the German colonial system was reticent of other
European colonial endeavors in Africa, specifically with regard to the exploitative policies of the
colonizers. From the colony’s inception in 1884 until this pivotal moment the colonial authority
maintained an understanding that interaction and, in many cases, reliance on the natives was a
necessity. The sudden inclusion of soldiers and military leaders unfamiliar with this policy upset
the extant balance in the colony and, with the military now in charge, colonial rule was
drastically different.
The key difference lay in the shift from exploitative tactics to exterminatory measures
that caused the incarceration, torture, murder, and genocide of Herero people. Though the field
of perpetrator studies is relatively new, little scholarly focus has been cast upon the German
colonial soldiers (Schutztruppe) as they are most frequently discussed as a homogeneous group. 1

1

A primary focus of my article, as well as the field perpetrator studies in general, revolves around the particular
motivations of those who partake in genocide. For detailed works regarding these motivations, see Hannah Arendt
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I contend that the perpetrators of this genocide can be separated into two broad subgroups,
distinguished by their intentions concerning the indigenous tribes. Those intentions were formed
over varying lengths of time but are the result of either firsthand experience with the racial
hierarchy in the colony or relying on information and misinformation relayed to the metropole.
Though the combined actions of these subgroups culminated in genocide, it is important to parse
out the nuances of perpetrator worldviews as they illuminate the complexity of participating in
genocidal events and encourage the notion that genocidaires are often shaped by idiosyncratic
formative experiences.
Though individual and group worldviews are inherently difficult to cobble together, it is
possible to identify distinct characteristics common among two broad divisions of the
Schutztruppe in Southwest Africa (SWA) particularly in 1904-5. Within the Schutztruppe
soldiers and, indeed, the colonial society as a whole, there existed a group referred to as the ‘Old
Africans’. For the purpose of this essay ‘Old African’ refers exclusively to those who had spent
varying, yet significant time (most commonly 1-10 years) in German SWA before the Herero
Uprising in January 1904. This group, led by Colonial Governor Theodor Leutwein, consisted
primarily of members of the colonial army and German settlers. To guarantee economic success,
Old Africans established and sought to cement a racial hierarchy in the colony that relegated the
indigenous population to a subservient role. The Herero Uprising and then, more forcefully, the
removal of Leutwein and subsequent appointment of General Lothar von Trotha in April of the

and Amos Elon, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books, 2006);
Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and The Final Solution in Poland (New York:
Harper-Collins, 1992); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners (New York: Random House, 1997);
Erin Jessee and Kjell Follingstad Anderson, Researching Perpetrators of Genocide (Madison, Wisconsin: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 2020); James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and
Mass Killing (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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same year discontinued this trajectory. Shortly after his appointment, von Trotha penned his
thoughts on how to suppress the rebellion:
The views of the Governor and also a few old Africaners on the one hand, and my views
on the other, differ completely. The first wanted to negotiate for some time already and
regard the Herero nation as necessary labor material for the future development of the
country. I believe that the nation as such should be annihilated, or, if this was not
possible by tactical measures, have to be expelled from the country by operative means
and further detailed treatment.2

This stance regarding the natives exhibits the stark contrast between the policy of the Old
Africans and the new, metropole-based policies that von Trotha enacted. Instead of adhering to
Leutwein’s extant hierarchy, von Trotha chose utter destruction of Old African ideology and
indigenous tribe alike.
The months between the outbreak of war (January 1904) and von Trotha’s appointment
(April 1904) are crucial to the establishment of a second group which I term “Metropole
Soldiers”, who reinforced the Old Africans and brought with them a different worldview.
Among the reasons for this dichotomy is the formative experience of these Metropole Soldiers,
many of whom were not prepared and had not been trained for a colonial war. 3 Exacerbating this
was the media arriving from the colony, which expressed outrage and horror at the guerilla raids
committed by natives. Though it was later discovered that many of the assaults were
exaggerated, soldiers who arrived in Southwest Africa saw themselves as avenging the
unwarranted attacks on their compatriots. The vengeful nature of many of these soldiers was
present throughout and even after von Trotha’s time in command and drew the ire and

2

Von Trotha to von Schlieffen 4.10.1904, cited in Jan Bart Gewald, Towards Redemption: A Socio-Political History
of the Herero of Namibia Between 1890 and 1923 (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1996), 207.
3
Those soldiers with experience were most often veterans of the similarly destructive Boxer Rebellion. See
Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 26.
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complaints of all levels of Old Africans. Ludwig von Estorff, the leading military mind of the
Old Africans, was staunchly opposed to von Trotha’s stratagem, writing that,
The policy of smashing the people in this way was as stupid as it was heartless. We
could have saved a great number of them and their herds if we had spared them and
helped them to recover. They had been sufficiently punished. I made this suggestion to
General von Trotha but he wanted their total extermination.4

Despite the notably different motivations, von Estorff, like other Old Africans, had little choice
but to march alongside metropole soldiers creating the façade of a cohesive unit on the outside
while ideologically needling each other under the surface.
German colonial studies already distinguish the Old Africans as a subgroup, particularly
in Southwest Africa. At the same time, their uniqueness is all too often overshadowed by the
cloudiness of colonial German hegemony. Intentionally recognizing the Old Africans as a
minority group complicates our perspective on both the dynamics undergirding German colonial
power structures as well as our understanding how the disunity within that structure impacted
genocidal dynamics. I add a group-based analysis to Matthias Häussler and Elizabeth Janik’s
argument that German settlers are rightly included as genocidal perpetrators alongside
Schutztruppe members due to the pervasive racism and emotional reactions of those settlers. 5
With settlers now included in the larger context of perpetrators, I reimagine group lines by
building off Asher Lubotzky’s work, which demonstrates both that the exterminatory policies of
the Schutztruppe contradicted settler desires and that relationship between these subgroups was
simultaneously competitive and cooperative.6 That the two groupings of genocidal perpetrators

4

Ludwig von Estorff, Wanderungen Und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika Und Südafrika 1894 - 1910
(Wiesbaden: Wiesbadener Kurier, 1969), 49.
5

Matthias Häussler and Elizabeth Janik, The Herero Genocide War, Emotion, and Extreme Violence in Colonial
Namibia (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021).
6
Asher Lubotzky, “‘Ja, es musste sein!’ German Settler Perceptions of Violence During the Herero and Nama War
(1904–1907),” Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture, no. 24, (2018): 7-31.
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had distinguishable worldviews can be seen in Daniel Walther and Isabella Hull’s analyses,
which illustrate how gender norms differed between Old Africans and Metropole soldiers.
Walther argues that colonial life revealed the strengths and weaknesses of German gender ideals,
specifically by connecting masculine roles with racial dependency on German women. 7 For her
part, Hull asserts that the violent “expectations and habits” German colonial soldiers exhibited
often overwhelmed and displaced the politically acceptable goals of colonial military practice,
including native suppression.8 Though each of the above authors recognize the Old Africans as a
unique group, there is a tendency to indirectly fold in members of this group into the larger
perpetrator collective when they should be analyzed as distinct from the Metropole Soldiers.
In the field of perpetrator studies, my analysis builds on research focused on determining
factors that drive people to partake in genocide. More specifically, it bridges the gap between
two dominant lenses of field, a macro-level focus of the group and a micro-level analysis of the
individual.9 In my analysis, I am guided by Henri Myrttinen’s lens, which breaks down and
examines perpetrators regarding their positions of power, societal expectations as well as degrees

7

Daniel J. Walther, "Gender Construction and Settler Colonialism in German Southwest Africa, 1894–1914," The
Historian 66, no. 1, (2004): 1-18.
8

Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2013).
9
The following offer a more detailed assessment of the various levels of perpetrator analysis and their interplay. For
macro-level analyses, see Olaf. Jensen and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann, Ordinary People as Mass Murderers:
Perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Michael Mann, “Were the
Perpetrators of Genocide ‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Real Nazis’? Results from Fifteen Hundred Biographies,” Journal of
Genocide Studies 14, (2000): 331-66; Joanne Pettitt, Perpetrators in Holocaust Narratives Encountering the Nazi
Beast. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017). For a micro-level perspective, see Lee Ann Fujii, Killing
Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011) and Scott Straus, The Order
of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013). For an analysis
of meso- or group dynamics, see Kühl Stefan, Ordinary Organizations: Why Normal Men Carried out the Holocaust
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016).
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of agency and vulnerability.10 This approach, though originally intended for individual
perpetrators of genocide, can be adapted and subsequently allow for the bifurcation of a single
perpetrator group into subgroups based on distinct commonalities that speak to shared, yet
competing worldviews. By recognizing motivations within the genocidal unit as traits that can be
used to form groups among likeminded individuals, perpetrator scholars gain another perspective
into the inner workings of group and military hierarchy during genocide thereby teasing out a
more complete understanding of ground level participant motivations.
In analyzing the goals and strategies of the Old Africans and Metropole Soldiers, I adopt
my interpretative lens from that of Kerrilee Hollows and Katarina Fritzon who, like Myrtinnen
and other perpetrator scholars, exclusively focus on individual motivations and worldviews at the
expense of subgroup interactions. Any Schutztruppe soldier or any genocidal perpetrator may be
found in one of Hollows and Fritzon’s four motivation-based categories: conservative,
expressive, adaptive, and integrative. An analysis of group dynamics in SWA, however, allows
us to focus exclusively on the latter two as they most accurately explain the motivations of our
subgroups.11 The ‘Old Africans’ fall into the ‘adaptive’ category, described as “dutiful and
lacking malice but also incorporating an underlying element of instrumental advance.” 12
Metropole-based soldiers, on the other hand, exemplify Hollows and Fritzon’s ‘integrated’

10

Henri Myrttinen, “Men Masculinities and Genocide,” in A Gendered Lens for Genocide Prevention, ed. Adam
Jones (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018), 27-47. See also Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, “Genocidal Masculinity,”
in New Directions in Genocide Research, ed. Adam Jones (New York: Routledge, 2011), 76-95.
11
The conservative and expressive categories are both much better suited for their intended purpose of individual
motivations as conservative perpetrators often have a politically centered reasoning for their actions while
expressive perpetrators are most simply seen as sadists, neither of which are overly representative of Schutztruppe
soldiers.
12
Kerrilee Hollows, and Katarina Fritzon, “‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Evil Monsters’?: An Action Systems Model of
Genocidal Actions and Characteristics of Perpetrators,” Law and Human Behavior 36, no. 5 (2012) 458-67.
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category, defined as “revengeful and aimed at resolving an internal state of disequilibrium or
contradiction that has resulted from perceived injustices.” 13
These two categories drive the narrative of opposing, yet comparable worldviews each
aimed at colonial dominance at the expense of the natives. Both subgroups sought the
establishment or, in the case of the Old Africans, a reestablishment, of the new colonial system
with the key difference being the place of the natives. Despite this semblance of unity which
was furthered by the military structure in place under von Trotha, both groups kept angling for
their own ideal outcome, creating division in the colonial ranks. I contend that the Old Africans
and Metropole Soldiers are rightly seen as ideologically competing subgroups within a larger
perpetrator group and that the birth of this dichotomy was influenced by formative differences
occurring, primarily, in the first four months of 1904.
Supporting my argument is a diverse and representative set of primary sources including:
metropole and colonial newspapers, journals of Metropole Soldier and Old African alike, letters,
postcards, autobiographies and governmental correspondence. This diversity is necessary in
establishing the plurality of means by which information was relayed to the metropole and in
illustrating the motivations of their authors. There exist relatively few adequate primary sources
detailing the experiences of soldiers in German SWA and when the Schutztruppe force is divided
into subgroups, the paucity of primary sources is similarly affected. 14 Those included sources
are representative of my overall findings and, although the thoughts of those cited may not be

13

Hollows and Fritzon, “‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Evil Monsters,’” 465.
Writing this under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic limited, in some instances, my ability to procure
primary source copies from various archives. For this reason, several primary sources are taken from other authors’
papers or monographs.
14
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universally shared, there is enough to suggest that their feelings were pervasive, especially
within their specific subgroup.
Not to be lost in this analysis of perpetrators are the victims, specifically the Herero and
the Nama tribes. The ideological battles over strategies for the German colonial space within the
Schutztruppe’s ranks were unimportant to those being murdered. The natives had no control
over how their attacks were misconstrued and how those exaggerations made their way into the
metropole press. They were simply focused on the overwhelming genocidal wave rather than the
conflicting worldviews of those pursuing them. To them, it was not a question of exploitation
versus extermination, but rather, could they survive either?

Shaping the Metropole’s Imago
German settlers in SWA played on the preexisting racial norms and exacerbated colonial
tensions by creating a narrative in which they starred as the last bastion of white progress and
civility against an overwhelming tide of indigenous savagery. This story was relayed to the
metropole in a multitude of ways, most specifically through letters, newspaper articles, diaries
and journals, but also through visual media, such as postcards. Tales of heinous and barbaric
acts committed by the natives, most of which, as will be discussed below, were exaggerated or
even completely fabricated, caught the attention of Parliament members and commoners alike.
Germans had long been cognizant of the racial battles taking place the world over and saw their
occupation and settling of SWA as participation in that struggle. 15 Receiving reports of natives

15

Lubotzky, “ German Settler Perceptions,” 9.

8

brutally attacking Europeans tugged at German heartstrings as well as “white pride” and
incensed the nation to swiftly and forcefully retaliate.
Race was a determining factor from the beginning of colonial occupation of SWA in
1884 and played a significant role in how the Germans set about establishing their system of
governance. From the founding of the colony, Germans envisioned in SWA a potential utopia,
still tied to the Fatherland, but without much of the accompanying bureaucracy. 16 Key to this
utopia was the racial hierarchy that saw the local tribes, at best, as subservient workers. Above
them were the German settlers, later dubbed ‘Old Africans’, who recognized the fruitful avenue
of indigenous labor. The colonial courts, staffed exclusively by Old Africans, served as the
means by which Germans maintained their social dominance. Interracial cases were heard by
these courts and rulings often mirrored and confirmed geographer Karl Dove’s belief that
“leniency vis-a-vis the colored is the equivalent of cruelty toward the whites.” 17 This
understanding dominated the interactions between settlers and locals until growing indigenous
unrest manifested itself in January 1904.
Numerous factors played into the Herero rebellion in 1904, not least of which was an
objection to the indigenous position in the established racial hierarchy. The settlers and longtime members of the colonial army self-identified as a paternalistic influence on the locals
exerting a “tough but just” system aimed at creating and then maintaining a forced labor

16

Jürgen Zimmerer, “The Model Colony?” in Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War (19041908) in Namibia and Its Aftermath, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2008), 29.
17

Despite Dove being a geographer, his most important work, Deutsch-Suedwest-Afrika, Ergebnisse einer
wissenschaftlichen Reise im suedlichen Damaralande, also included ethnographies of the various native tribes found
in the colony and their interactions with German settlers. There exists a multitude of examples in German
Southwest Africa in which similar crimes, most often murder and theft, received dissimilar sentences based entirely
on racial differences of the accused thereby affirming Dove’s statement. Karl Dove, Memoir, 1896, cited in George
Steinmetz, The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and SWA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 190.
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system.18 Such a system was, as far as the settlers were concerned, even favorable for African
tribes on account of their quasi-human status as it afforded them the opportunity, with hard work,
to elevate their culture to one more closely resembling the Germans. 19 This paternalistic racism
underpinned the subsequent uprising as settler oppression was another key factor in the Herero
revolt. Once the Herero were in open rebellion, German settlers quickly switched from a
paternalistic “to an exterminatory racism.”20 Though the transition from paternal to
exterminatory racism is understandably viewed as an extreme about face, the fear of being vastly
outnumbered in a foreign land by increasingly hostile forces was a significant contributor to the
change in the colony’s racist principles. Importantly, this switch also predicated a shift in what
kind of information was relayed to the metropole as Herero attacks against settlers dominated
what little “news” made it back to Germany.
Stressing the centrality of the natives to the colony’s economic aims illuminates the
importance of this shift in colony-based media. The Old Africans who settled in SWA were,
excluding retiring soldiers, often economically astute farmers capable of buying land and hiring
local natives as help. The lack of a well-established economic hierarchy, as seen in Germany,
saw these settlers enjoying a “bourgeois lifestyle,” relying on their own work as well as that of
the indigenous population.21 With slavery no longer a de jure policy, German settlers and the

18

Lubotzky, “German Settler Perceptions,” 21.
Lubotzky notes that “exploitation and oppression were considered to be a ‘natural state for the African native’” in
which case some semblance of paternalism would in fact be seen as favorable despite the exploitation and
oppression continuing to occur. Lubotzky, “German Settler Perceptions,” 17. See also Helmut Weber Smith who
discusses the widespread belief amongst members of German Parliament that Africans did not meet the criteria of
human. Helmut Weber Smith, “The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of Miscegenation: Notes of Debates in the
German Reichstag Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904-14,” in The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism
and Its Legacy, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantrop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1998), 112.
19

20

Klaus Bachmann, Genocidal Empires: German Colonialism in Africa and the Third Reich (Berlin: Peter Lang,
2018), 282.
21
Conrad, German Colonialism, 103.
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colonial government strove to avoid terms such as “forced labor” and instead, attempted to
reeducate the natives to rid them of their supposed predisposition to laziness. 22 This careful
wording, however, was forgotten with the dawn of the revolt. The economic goal and policy of
the colony became “robbing [natives of] their economic independence, which [meant] making
them slaves.”23
It must be noted that there was a hierarchy within the native populations themselves
regarding each tribe’s perceived penchant for physical work. The Rehoboth Basters, an ethnic
group descended from White European men and Black African women, were the favorites of
settlers due to their mixed ancestry while the Nama were seen as lazy, unfit for hard labor, and
likely to fade into extinction.24 This stereotype followed the Nama to and through their own war
with the Germans and provided an important basis for the exterminatory policy created for their
annihilation. By contrast, the Herero were deemed suitable, though slothful, workers and their
importance to the economic aspirations of the colony, at least in the eyes of Old Africans, was
not diminished by the war. As we will see, while the settlers desired a war of subjugation to
solidify the extant, exploitative racial hierarchy, the ultimate exterminatory policies of the
military did not fulfill this design.
The colonial relationship, especially in terms of communication, between SWA and
Germany was anything but strong as the German Parliament continually put European and
domestic concerns ahead of colonial issues. Much of the information brought to the metropole
arrived through back channels in the form of letters, postcards, and colonial newspaper articles.

22

Zimmerer, “Model Colony,” 33. See also Lubotzky, “German Settler Perceptions,” 19, which argues settlers
wanted a war to subjugate, but not annihilate, natives as Blacks were crucial to the colony’s future economy.
23
Kölnische Volkszeitung, no. 57, January 20, 1904, 1. Abend-Ausgabe, 1.
24

Lubotzky, “German Settler Perceptions,” 15.
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Postcards, in particular, are useful as they present worthwhile insights regarding what images
soldiers and settlers wanted to provide to their families in Germany. 25 More significantly for this
study, they also were central in settler aims to normalize the exoticism of colonial Africa as they
familiarized the metropole with the landscape as well as the effects and progress of the war. 26
Letters and newspapers naturally played a crucial role in fostering these notions as well although
they, intentionally or otherwise, frequently misled the metropole. As shown below, native
attacks that made the headlines both in Germany and SWA were often embellished or even
completely fabricated. Such instances should be interpreted as settlers calling on the metropole
for assistance in quelling the rebellion. The distinction of settlers here is important as they did
not necessarily reflect the entire colony since “settler interests were not necessarily translated
into policy.”27
Prior to the events that culminated in the Herero Uprising in January 1904, the majority
of media originating from the colony was propagandistic. Settlers and the colonial government
alike wanted to cultivate the image that the colony was a suitable location not only for travel, but
more importantly, with the natives under heel, an exceptional and suitable place to settle. While
word of mouth also played a role, postcards were the dominant means by which colonists aimed
to show the potential of the young territory. Axster has acquired a collection of postcards mailed
to Germany from the colony and a significant majority show either the beauty of the local

25

Georg Hillebrecht, in his diary states, “on my postcard I told you that the Herero hunt has reached an end for us”
found in Andreas E. Eckl, "S'ist ein Übles Land Hier": Zur Historiographie Eines Umstrittenen Kolonialkrieges:
Tagebuchaufzeichnungen Aus Dem Herero-Krieg in Deutsch-Südafrika 1904 Von Georg Hillebrecht Und Franz
Ritter Von Epp (Köln: R. Köppe, 2005), 110.
26

Felix Axster, “‘...Will Try to Send You the Best Views from Here’: Postcards from the Colonial War in Namibia
(1904-1908),” in German Colonialism, Visual Culture and Modern Memory, ed. Volker M. Langbehn (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2010) 65.
27
Steinmetz, The Devil's Handwriting, 21.
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landscape, the construction of buildings familiar to prospective emigrants, or both. 28 Images of
distinctly Germanic structures along carefully constructed streets in a foreign land reinforced the
perception of Germans as dominant over both the terrain and the natives. 29Pictured below is
Kaiser Wilhelmstrasse in the capital city, Windhuk. Though the buildings are somewhat shorter
than standard metropole architecture, the neat line of structures as well as the flanking trees do
evoke a European feel. There is little evidence between the landscape and structures in this
photograph that suggests this location as anywhere other than Europe. It is only the small group
of Africans huddled off to the side neatly juxtaposed under the imposing brick building and
striking German flag reinforcing colonial dominance that assures the viewer of the exotic locale.
The familiarity of the buildings combined with the exoticism of the region suggested an area in
which new settlers could find excitement while still enjoying the comforts of home. Postcards
such as these were typical in the years both leading up to and even during the later stages of the
Herero War. In 1904, however, the metropole saw an unmistakable shift in the messages from
the colony.

28

Felix Axster, Koloniales Spektakel in 9 x 14: Bildpostkarten Im Deutschen Kaiserreich (transcript Verlag, 2014).
See especially Chapter 2, Section 1.
29
Among his collection, Axster includes a collection of Hermann Ohrts’ postcards in section 2.1, of which no fewer
than eleven offer images of German constructions juxtaposed with distinctly non-German landscape.
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Felix Axster, Koloniales Spektakel in 9x14, “Westliche Kaiser Wilhelmstrasse,” p. 95

The Herero Uprising on January 12, 1904 was the turning point in colonial media
destined for the metropole. The Herero attacks throughout the northern part of the colony stirred
up an understandable fear amongst the settler population as many of the Herero raids were
against farms and not against military fortifications. To expedite retaliation from the metropole,
settlers claimed that raids targeted German women and children, alongside men. 30 While there
were occasional instances in which this happened, it was decidedly against the express
commands issued by Herero leader, Samuel Maherero. 31 Though there are certainly instances
during which white women and children were killed, there are many more examples of them
being transported to the nearest German settlement and released. One such example is that of
Missionary Wilhelm Eich and his family who were captured by the Herero and subsequently
brought to Okahandja unharmed.32 Despite this and other similar instances, settlers and local
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newspapers alike ran with the hyperbole that white presence in the colony was on the verge of
being exterminated unless reinforcements arrived from Germany. This new construct of the
natives, as Klaus Bachmann rightly observes, “openly contradicted the picture of immature
childish natives with whom German newspaper readers had been acquainted.” 33 This was a
powerful reshaping of the metropole’s imago as the Herero tribe became associated with ruthless
savages who attacked and murdered defenseless civilians, which we will see below. Though the
truth of the raids did eventually surface, it was ultimately disregarded as metropole newspapers
admitted that stories of murdered women and children “appear a good example of the Herero
influencing German soldiers. One would likewise want to preserve women and children.” 34
To further their goal of inciting the metropole to action, settlers resorted to, among other
methods, postcards. The postcard below, sent on February 24, 1904, depicts six German soldiers
of various branches of their armed forces with subtle smiles appearing rather nonchalant or even
pleased. They are leading a group of seven Herero prisoners under the title: “The Rebellion in
German Southwest Africa.”35 Also of note is the sentence at the bottom of the postcard which
suggests the work to be simple or easy yet dignified and refined. Cementing the notion that
suppressing the natives is child’s play is the German soldier whose face is obscured by a rifle
tweaking the ear of his prisoner. At the time this was sent to the metropole, the German forces in
SWA had anything but the calm expressions and light-hearted attitudes represented on cardstock.
Images like this were not meant to and did not convey accuracy, but rather implied that rounding
up the indigenous population required little effort and was a relatively easy assignment for
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prospective soldiers. When the alleged simplicity of the task was combined with the desire to
reassert dominance and save their fellow Germans from barbarians, metropole soldiers’
formative experiences were complete.

Felix Axster, Koloniales Spektakel in 9x14, “Der Aufstand in Deutsch Südwestafrika,” p. 122

Despite the exaggeration often associated with indigenous raids, this was a war that begot
extensive damage to German property and psyche. Descriptions of Herero raids appeared across
all forms of media detailing the utter destruction to the point that “nothing, nothing was
spared”.36 Upon reaching the metropole, these descriptions broke the populace and the
government into two groups distinct in their views, but united in their solution. Part of the
population viewed the natives as resistance fighters rebelling against unjust colonial policies.
The vast majority, however, deemed the locals as “ingrates [who] needed to be kept down with
violence.”37 Germans, late to the colonial game, had relatively little experience waging this type
of colonial war and were already at a disadvantage due not only to a general lack of troops, but
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many troops stationed in SWA were already putting down a Bondelswart rebellion in the
southern part of the colony.38 The resulting lack of available fighters to address the Herero
nation in the north exacerbated the widespread panic that had overtaken the colony. Those, like
Josef Bendix, who were available to fight against the Herero were terrified as “most had not seen
any Hereros and were therefore fearful” to the point that one of Bendix’s fellow soldiers was
shot in the leg by friendly fire during a night that saw no attack. 39 Settlers were forced to
abandon their farms to native raids and relocate to the nearest military outpost for their own
protection. Being forced to hunker down for protection from the “inferior natives” was “a
humiliation and disgrace” and reflected poorly on both the Kaiserreich and white status atop the
racial hierarchy.40 This humiliation at the hands of “savages” sent both the settlers and the
metropole into an uproar that manifested in an unquestionable need for extreme retaliation.
While the Herero raiding parties were the main cause of settler apprehension, indigenous
women cemented the settler perception of indigenous savagery. Views like that of Oberleutnant
Stuhlman encapsulated the fear that soldiers and settlers felt should they fall into the hands of
Herero women: “The most gruesome mutilations await him, such as gouging out his eyes, having
his sex organs cut off, slowly and gradually having his head bashed in with a kirri. 41 They are
beasts and even worse than their male peers in the tribe.” 42 Though this may have been the
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pervasive sentiment among Germans, concrete instances of indigenous women mutilating
German corpses are extremely rare and those that do exist were often victims retaliating for
specific actions, often sexual in nature, undertaken by their victim. 43 This exaggeration of truth
did not inhibit German soldiers from taking extreme retaliatory measures to combat these
perceived slights. Native women, due to views like Stuhlman’s, were not exempt from
becoming unnecessary casualties of war as the honor code detailing the conduct of war and the
treatment of noncombatants was often overlooked by commanders, settlers, and the metropole. 44
Given their combined racial and enemy combatant status, they were not seen as worthy of
sparing, particularly by the Metropole Soldiers, often finding their way into German diaries and
journals most frequently appearing as “beasts” but occasionally, and especially in Old African
accounts, as “unfortunate victims of the war.” 45
Indigenous women were only seen as victims near the conclusion of the war; German
settler women, however, played this role in colonial media from the onset of the Herero
Uprising. Throughout SWA’s colonial history, but especially in the 19 th century, the physical
and therefore media presence of German women was minute. As the colony progressed,
however, the need for white women became ever greater as means of unlocking the full potential
of the colonial man as well as guarding white culture from ethnic “polluting”. 46 These same
women became focal points in the colony’s efforts to manipulate the metropole. Newspapers ran
stories of murdered women and families or those “who had become captive daughters [and] had
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to cope with the humiliation and shame.” 47 Stories depicting the brutal murder of settler women
were commonplace and though they were often refuted in the colony itself, the refutation rarely
accompanied these stories to the metropole.48 Descriptions of these events were not limited to
journals and newspapers. Gesine Krueger includes an image from a contemporary metropole
colonial handbook depicting two Herero men, armed with a gun and a club, attacking a white
woman on her doorstep.49 The weapons symbolize both the primitiveness of the natives as well
as the foolhardiness of Leutwein in trading them guns. Images such as this were crucial in
evoking the protective fervor of the metropole and its soldiers.
The messages of Herero violence primarily made their way back to Germany through
back channels, causing a groundswell of support for a decisive show of vengeful retaliation.
Those that wrote letters and postcards home were cognizant of the fact that their families would
likely show their words to friends and neighbors who were equally interested in the colony. 50
George Steinmetz rightly identifies this type of communication as crucial in the creation of the
metropole’s “imago.”51 Individual letters, postcards and the like, circumvented the way that
many metropole-based civilians received their information which allowed settlers to appeal
directly to common citizens and soldiers who were most likely to be enlisted. 52 Josef Bendix
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even went so far as to include the latest issues of colonial newspapers among his letters home. 53
Newspapers played a significant role in how information made its way back to the metropole as
they were still the primary means of obtaining information and perspective on the colony. Georg
Hillebrecht, a metropole-based doctor now serving in the Schutztruppe, noted that “Before
Waterberg, all newspapers and intelligent people called for the complete annihilation of the
enemy, or at least the capture of the entire Hereroland. Trotha had perhaps, through middlemen,
allowed similar views to be published in European newspapers.” 54 It is not a far leap for
historians or contemporary Schutztruppe soldiers to believe that the General, seen most
frequently as the primary architect of the Herero genocide, would utilize the media to project the
need for annihilation.
Once presented with the case to reestablish colonial equilibrium set forth by local media,
metropole civilians individually, and indeed Germany as a whole, concluded that action needed
to be taken against the Herero tribe. Reports coming out of SWA detailing rising death tolls
encouraged the populace to upgrade the colonial revolt to a full-fledged war that saw the Herero
challenging the Fatherland and even white supremacy. 55 Even common metropolitan citizens,
like violin maker Otto Seifert, were so incensed that they took it upon themselves to write
directly to the Kaiser encouraging him to take decisive action. 56 Metropole elites grew
increasingly concerned that this revolt would negatively impact Germany’s global status as a
colonial player. The unified German state had only recently ascended to a position among the
world powers and could not let a colonial failure tarnish that image. The country’s futility in
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immediately quashing this rebellion grew to the point that retaliation against the natives became
an issue of maintaining and, indeed, restoring German honor. 57
Popular opinion was not lost on German Parliament, in fact, it was echoed in the debates
that dominated colonial discourse. Though the colonial holdings were very often an afterthought
in German politics, the moments in which the war held parliamentary focus exhibited several key
debates, not least of which was the degree of humanity found within indigenous populations. 58
Helmut Walser Smith details these arguments that took place often between native sympathizer,
August Bebel, and conservative Graf Ludwig zu Reventlow. The latter expressed notions that
were exceedingly similar to those offered by the settlers citing instances of Africans “tearing out
the intestines of live women and hanging them on the next tree.” 59 The likelihood of such
instances occurring is suspect at best, especially given the aforementioned behaviors of the
Herero during the early months of 1904. It is a much safer assumption that political leaders,
using the overblown accounts arriving from the colony, sought to incense the nation into action.
This suggests that though there may not have been a direct line from settler pens to
Parliamentary action, the exaggerations prevalent in Southwest African media did affect colonial
discourse among the upper echelon of German government. This discourse would evolve
alongside the war itself to include an assessment critiquing and justifying the extreme measures
used by the military, especially under von Trotha’s leadership. 60
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The Dichotomy of Perpetrators
Having analyzed the media’s role in Old Africans and the Metropole Soldiers formative
differences, this section explores and contributes to the contention made by Hollows and Fritzon
that “genocidal perpetrators are not a homogenous group” by identifying distinguishing
characteristics between the Old Africans and the metropole-based reinforcements. 61 Each
group’s unique experiences then informed, in accordance with Henri Myrrttinen’s ‘critical
masculinities’ approach, their ultimate actions, how they viewed those actions and why they
committed them.62 This lens allows for a more thorough analysis of the genocidal actions and
intentions of the specific groups that committed them that might otherwise have been shrouded
by the umbrella term ‘perpetrator’ or by observing the Schutztruppe as a single entity. In
looking at the Old Africans and the metropole-based soldiers, many of the traits each group
exhibited are present regardless of an individual’s status. In distinguishing these groups, we must
analyze both their formative experience as well as internalized gender expectations, such as
avenger, ascribed to them by society. 63
Genocidaires, much like other ordinary men and women, are the sum of their formative
experiences. The formative experiences of the Old Africans and metropole soldiers are
inherently different and therefore their actions are rightly seen in a unique light. Most Old
Africans had an intimate understanding of colonial society and as such, were familiar with the
established racial hierarchy and maintained relationships with the indigenous population. It was
quite common for Old African soldiers to eventually retire and begin working the land, often
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relying on natives as laborers, thereby imbuing those natives with an economic purpose ignored
by metropole soldiers.64 Even those Old African soldiers not intent on settling down in the
colony recognized the economic importance of the natives and often preferred capturing the
Herero as opposed to simply defeating them. 65 Metropole-based soldiers, however, were only
privy to the media that made it back to Germany which depicted the natives as savage brutes
attacking the foundation of white supremacy and undermining Germany’s global status and
colonial mission. These soldiers likely saw themselves as avenging the exaggerated death and
destruction that shaped the metropole’s imago. Heinrich Geisel is one such soldier who, based
on analysis of his diary, is unremarkably common save that his thoughts were preserved in his
writing. Particularly interesting is that Geisel makes careful note of each destroyed German farm
his patrol passes throughout the marches recorded in his diary. 66 Though he avoids detailed
discussion outside of terse comments such as “abandoned farm, occupants dead,” his consistent
inclusion of these deserted farms suggests that not only was he aware of the situation upon
arrival, but that retaliation for this devastation weighed heavily on his mind. He was primed to
pay attention to particular kinds of phenomena (such as destroyed farms) and then record it. I do
not mean to imply here that all members of the Old Africans or the metropole-based soldiers
experienced formative events exactly alike, rather, that the commonalities of what they
underwent, and their frame of reference impacted how they reacted to their genocidal commands.
Though the differences between these two groups are certainly evident and a central
focus, it must also be mentioned that similarities abound as well. Of those, the guiding
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commonality must be that soldiers, regardless of their formative backgrounds, were inherently
“ordinary men” and not otherwise predisposed to violence. These soldiers were not, however,
able to meet the expectations of Colonial Director Stuebel who, in a report to German Parliament
extols the “German character [which] does not tend to cruelty and brutality.” 67 While character
may not inherently tend towards violence, “situational factors, especially fear [and] social
pressure” are all elements that were commonplace among soldiers in SWA and help explain why
mass murder or genocide was committed. 68 This is perhaps best evidenced by the report of an
anonymous German soldier whose patrol spotted:
Fleeing men and women, who made signs of wanting to surrender. As I was proceeding
to take the prisoner, my guide, NCO Kutschke, started shooting against my orders. That
caused them to run. Now we all shot at them, but because we did so from our horses, the
results were naturally few, only two or three Herero fell...I gathered my people again and
forbade further shooting without my order.69

The societal pressure caused by his subordinate’s choice to begin shooting was enough to move
this soldier and the rest of his patrol to partake in an event that might otherwise have been
resolved without unnecessary murder. This instance of insubordination is indicative of the
power struggle within the Schutztruppe ranks as opposing motivations clashed. It is ultimately a
microcosm of the group dynamics at play in German patrols as they often contained a mix of Old
Africans and metropole-based soldiers. While soldiers may have fit into the “ordinary man”
perpetrator label, the group dynamic, especially when von Trotha’s exterminatory orders are
considered, was such that these ordinary men, particularly Old Africans, felt pressure to
participate in actions they viewed as counterproductive and indeed, detrimental to the society
they envisioned.
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It is odd to consider genocidal participants as lacking malice, yet that, along with a sense
of dutiful participation and an eye towards instrumental advancements, defines Hollows and
Fritzon’s adaptive category.70 The anonymous quote from above displays this lack of malice
while still adhering to duty as does noted Old African Captain Victor von Franke, who admits to
“Fighting with myself, whether I should have a Herero shot...And then I am freed from my
doubts: the prisoner dies [anyway].”71 In looking at the instrumental advance element to the
category we must refer back to the intended economic goals of Old African/Leutwein regime.
This group was against the eradication of the indigenous population as their removal would
substantially hinder economic progress in the colony. In order to account for the advancement of
the colony, Old Africans relied on the suppression, or re-suppression, of the natives into their
subservient role in the existing racial hierarchy.
The interactions between Old Africans and their metropole reinforcements show not only
the inherent dichotomy in each group’s motivations, but also just how different their actions
were in practice. Perhaps the best example is Governor Leutwein’s son, Paul, who was a newly
arrived soldier from Germany and served under Major Ludwig von Estorff, another leading Old
African. While in the field, the younger Leutwein is cited as having “unhesitatingly shot an old
Herero woman for spying because he knew Estorff would not.” 72 Paul Leutwein’s actions and,
more importantly, his rationale typifies Hollows and Fritzon’s ‘integrated’ category, which is
seen as “revengeful and aimed at resolving an internal state of disequilibrium or contradiction
that has resulted from perceived injustices.”73 Settler-driven media likely helped construct the
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narrative of injustice and evoke the desire for revenge that drove these Metropole Soldiers to
crush the natives, which they believed would ultimately restore the colony’s balance.
The balance sought by the Metropole Soldiers would have effectively removed the
foundation of the Old African’s racial hierarchy, which sought ‘instrumental advancement’ in the
economic sphere. Excluding the aforementioned penchant that Old African foot-soldiers had for
eventually becoming settlers who would then rely on native labor, there exists very little direct
evidence detailing how this diminutive group assessed the economic benefits of keeping the
natives alive. However, the aspirations of these men most likely aligned with those of leading
Old Africans, like Governor Leutwein, as well as prominent settlers whose voices had the ear of
metropole and colonial newspapers. Leutwein in particular, vehemently opposed the evergrowing opinion and likelihood of annihilation, considering it “a grave mistake from an
economic point of view.”74 Aside from playing a role in building the colony’s infrastructure,
natives were needed to maintain the existing cattle-based economy while new agricultural and
material revenue sources were developed. 75 This ‘adaptive’ motivation thought process was not
limited merely to the existing Old Africans and like-minded settlers. It also made its way back to
the metropole and into the articles of popular newspapers like the Kölnische Volkszeitung which
made the case that instead of being annihilated, “the Blacks should be ruled with an iron fist” and
that “anyone of another opinion...will be ridiculed as a dreamer.” 76 This dream could entail
either side of the ‘black question’ as both the perceived ability to coexist with the indigenous
population as well as the economic success of the colony without the survival of the natives were
unlikely. There was, therefore, no other logical alternative save robbing them of their “economic
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independence [and] making them into slaves.” 77 In this way, the Old African soldiers and
settlers were similarly situated against the elimination of a population that could be and would be
used as de facto slaves.
Consequently, the Old Africans found themselves at odds with metropole-based soldiers
intent on eliminating their prospective workforce and disrupting the intended advancement
which was crucial to their adaptive motivations. Captain von Franke, for one, spends an
exorbitant amount of time in his journals chastising and complaining about the metropole
recruits, who appear excessively disorganized, arrogant, and unable to meet the high standards of
honor befitting a German soldier.78 While there are many instances in which von Franke berates
these newer soldiers, one episode in particular recounts a moment during which von Franke’s
extensive experience was overlooked in favor of young settler opinions. 79 This encourages the
notion that Old Africans saw their leadership and experience being devalued and hints at the
attempt by the metropole-based leadership to resolve the perceived disequilibrium in the territory
without Old African influence. Three days after von Franke’s experience is ignored, he pens one
of his most revealing journal entries in which he attacks the metropole leadership and soldiers.
He writes:
I have contempt for this whole [metropole-based] society, because I see only egotistical
ends being followed and to those ends only the worst means are being used. I continually
observe traits that make me appalled at the lack of discipline in these new, young
soldiers.80
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Though von Franke does not specifically detail the “ends” he mentions, we can infer that he is
addressing the change in political and military leadership that accompanied von Trotha’s
assumption of command. Von Franke’s views are not surprising given the decline in Old
African power, but they do cast light on how the adaptively motivated Old African path of
advancement is being usurped by an undisciplined power bent on using extreme means to
recognize their aims.
That undisciplined metropole power had little to no regard for the economic and
instrumental advancement which drove the Old Africans. Instead, their integratively motivated
actions are much more readily interpreted as avenging the crimes committed against German
settlers specifically and white superiority broadly. Despite this vengeful crusade undertaken by
von Trotha, he curiously ignores the very voices of those settlers whom he is avenging and
protecting.81 While there is no concrete reasoning for this omission, it is possible that he
identifies these settlers as members of Leutwein‘s old regime and therefore as participants in the
policies and actions that instigated the uprising and contributed to the state of disequilibrium. On
a foot soldier level, many, though not all, metropole soldiers identified with Henrich Geisel who
developed a hate for the indigenous “evil fellows [who] must work and are strongly watched” as
soon as they stepped off the boat in Swakopmund.82 This preconceived perception of the natives
only solidified as soldiers and officers prolonged their stay and engaged in battles. Johannes
Spiecker, a travelling missionary, recounts a conversation with a group of German officers in
which the common sentiment was “we hang them all...every means is right against these people
[meaning all native tribes].”83 It is telling that the discussion of mass murder or what was to
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eventually be coined genocide, was an acceptable topic of conversation. These officers felt
secure enough in their convictions that they paid little heed to not only the public setting for their
discourse, but also to the fact that their audience included a man of God. Such a discussion,
especially considering setting and listener, suggests a common belief that such actions were not
only permissible, but necessary to restore equilibrium to the colony.
Restoration of colonial equilibrium was but one of the ways that aristocratic, metropolebased personnel sought to discredit Leutwein and his policies. Critics like Ritter von Epp, who
would eventually become known for his role in the Nazi party, arrived with other metropole
reinforcements in 1904. Two days after arriving and while under Captain von Franke’s
command, von Epp decrees that “Leutwein’s system of mild hands against the Blacks at the
expense of the Whites will be universally judged.” 84 Leutwein’s policies were certainly judged
by those from the metropole and were found to be lacking. Ever focused on the colony’s
economic progress, Leutwein had attempted to negotiate with the indigenous population by
building “golden bridges” which was seen by the metropole as his “big mistake.” 85 The criticism
of Leutwein and his policy continued even after his removal, indeed, his replacement, von
Trotha, was perhaps the most steadfast critic. Writing shortly after his appointment, von Trotha
penned his thoughts on how to end the war. He writes that his views and those of “a few old
Africaners...differ completely” and while the latter saw the Herero as “necessary labor material”
von Trotha preferred “annihilation, or... [expulsion] from the country.” 86 This particular passage
is an underutilized source in the argument for proving von Trotha’s genocidal intent and should
be read in concert with his Extermination Order. He recognizes Leutwein’s alternative and the
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potential economic benefit of the plan before completely disregarding it in favor of extreme
violence. In von Trotha’s view, and in keeping with the integrative perpetrator motivation, the
only way to restore the colony to an acceptable balance was to rid it entirely of the Herero
nation.
Understandably, this policy drew the attention and then ire of Old Africans in both
military and civilian circles. The response to von Trotha’s policy was complicated as the Old
Africans employed in the Schutztruppe were under von Trotha’s command and they were
therefore unable to openly question these orders. As such, officers like von Franke were forced
to keep their objections hidden away in their thoughts and, in the case of von Franke, in journals.
Amid pursuing the Herero into the Sandveldt, von Franke laments that “this kind of
incompetence on the part of the [German] leadership...must lead to a catastrophe.” 87 Despite his
internal struggle with the military’s stated practices, von Franke conforms to his adaptive role of
dutifully accepting his place and participating alongside the metropole soldiers he detests.
Though most Old Africans were, like von Franke, unable to voice their concerns directly to
military leadership, Ludwig von Estorff was in the rare position that afforded him this
opportunity. Von Estorff was the commander specifically put in charge of the Herero pursuit
after the Battle of Waterberg and so had an intimate understanding of what was being asked of
him and his men. He was staunchly opposed to von Trotha’s stratagem, calling it “as stupid as it
was heartless” and lamenting over the loss of “a great number of [Herero] and their herds. Von
Estorff even went a step further in that he “made this suggestion to General von Trotha but he
wanted their total extermination.”88 In addition to making his stance on extermination clear, von
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Estorff was also sure to include the economic reasons for his position. Von Estorff’s economic
concern highlights the intended instrumental advancement that is associated with adaptive
motivations. This was not the only time von Estorff had a productive economic idea rebuked by
von Trotha. He also proposed that the native herds be absorbed by the state and that care of
these herds be given to the natives.89 This behavior is exemplary of Old Africans, seeing the
natives as central to the colony’s economic future and their removal as detrimental to eventual
prosperity. Furthermore, von Estorff shows not only a lack of malice, typical in adaptive
motivations, but just as with von Franke, he dutifully accepts his role and is complicit in the
Schutztruppe’s actions. Due to the complicit nature of these Old African soldiers and officers,
they must still be seen as perpetrators regardless of their lack of malice and quiet objections. 90
Criticism of von Trotha’s exterminatory measures was not limited to military soldiers
and officers but was also found in many facets of civilian life. Though public opinion turned
against the General by the end of 1904, coinciding with his departure from office, leading
military officials in Germany were unperturbed by the mass murders committed under von
Trotha’s watch.91 Reports of atrocities committed by the Schutztruppe reached the Fatherland
and prompted outcries against the Schutztruppe’s exterminatory policy based primarily on
“humanity and practical considerations.”92 The practical considerations, though not spelled out
in the article, merit discussion as it is more than plausible that the economic concerns of the Old
Africans are foremost among them due to the previously discussed relationship between the Old
Africans and the metropole media. Naturally, the critiques and general displeasure with von
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Trotha’s methods were stronger in SWA than they were in Germany. As mentioned earlier, the
interests and perspectives of the German settlers were often aligned with those of the Old
African soldiers. In the colonial Windhuker Nachrichten, settlers set forth that “not annihilation
had to be the guiding thought, but the preservation of what we have in the Herero: a tremendous,
converted into labor-force, economic capital.” 93 Again, we can identify that the adaptively
motivated Old Africans, regardless of their level of culpability, shared the common element of
advancement that underpinned their actions. We must remember, however, that despite their
antigenocidal stance, Old Africans like von Estorff, who had chastised his own military
leadership for their exuberance in annihilating the Herero, still saw them as “brutish, bloodthirsty
murderers” that despite their savagery could be a catalyst for an economic boon. 94
Even those colonists that were not specifically linked to the Old Africans often took
exception to the way the natives were pursued. Missionaries, such as Johannes Spiecker, were
put in a tenuous position between allegiance to the metropole and providing aid for the natives
under their watch. In a discussion with two officers in 1906, Spiecker writes “they want[ed] to
employ military patrols to clean the land of roaming Herero. I repeatedly pronounced my hope
that this would be achieved in a peaceful manner, and that the military would not have to
intervene again.”95 Years after the initial uprising and quelling, there was still notable concern
amongst civilians in the colony that the Schutztruppe would revert to their violent past.
Statements such as this validate the concern that Governor Leutwein maintains in the final
chapter of his autobiography, namely that if “we check what business we have done with our
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policy of violence, a picture emerges that does not have the slightest resemblance to an
advantageous one.”96
Conclusion
In the titular quote of this article, Old African soldier Josef Bendix unknowingly
prophesized an immediate and sharp reversal in German colonial policy. Writing about the
arrival of the first group of reinforcements from the metropole, Bendix was right in asserting that
the ship’s arrival “will change the situation immediately.” 97 He could not have known that with
the arrival of von Trotha alongside those soldiers, the exploitative policies and racial hierarchy
he and other Old Africans sought to reestablish would be ignored in favor of newer
exterminatory aims.
I have attempted to show that despite the outwardly common goal and united front
portrayed by the Schutztruppe in dealing with the native rebellions of 1904, the ultimate aims for
the Old Africans and the Metropole Soldiers were in conflict. The exploitative economic
policies of the Old Africans were dependent on the natives who remained ensconced in the
exterminatory crosshairs of metropole soldiers. This ideological difference took shape in a
matter of roughly three months in early 1904 during which time the Herero Uprising was in full
swing and striking fear into Schutztruppe soldier and settler alike. These attacks were then
fabricated and/or exaggerated before being relayed to the metropole. These stories became part
of the formative experiences of Metropole Soldiers and in so doing, established a gap between
the worldviews of the two subgroups.
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A few months after the inception of this project, the German government announced a
1.3-billion-dollar package commonly seen as reparations for the atrocities of over a century ago.
Critics of the policy argue that this money should be given to the descendants of those who
suffered and died at the hands of Old Africans and Metropole Soldiers alike. As much as I have
sought in this paper to encourage the bifurcation of the Schutztruppe soldiers, in no way do I
seek to remove either group from the label of perpetrator. Though this division is helpful in
analyzing motivation and the inner workings of a perpetrator group, it does not and cannot
remove the complicity that is rightly attributed to the soldiers as a whole. The German
government’s monetary support does set an interesting example, however, as to how genocidal
perpetrators may eventually seek to make economic amends for their exploitative and/or
exterminatory actions.
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